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SHOULD THEY STAY OR SHOULD THEY GO: RETHINKING 
THE USE OF CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE IN 
IMMIGRATION LAW
Sara Salem*
Abstract
Although absent from modern English conversation, the words moral 
turpitude continue to carry devastating consequences for undocumented 
aliens living in the United States. Under federal immigration law, an alien 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude may be deported or denied 
entry into the United States. Perhaps most significantly, nearly all 
immigration relief is conditioned on an alien having never been convicted 
of a crime involving moral turpitude. So the question becomes, what is a 
crime involving moral turpitude? There is currently no clear answer. No 
one standard exists for determining whether a conviction qualifies as a 
crime involving moral turpitude. Circuit courts are split, each applying 
their own body of case law to determine issues of moral turpitude that 
reach their dockets. This Note reviews the history and inconsistencies of
CIMT jurisprudence, explains Attorney General Mukasey’s failed 
attempt to standardize the area, and finally recommends a standard 
approach to be applied by the BIA and circuit courts across the country.
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INTRODUCTION1
Courts have long struggled to define “crimes involving moral 
turpitude.” In 1916, during a discussion by the House Committee on 
Immigration, an Illinois Representative said, “No one can really say what 
is meant by saying a crime involving moral turpitude.”2 In 1956, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that, “the borderline of 
‘moral turpitude’ is not an easy one to locate.”3 In 2005, one judge 
referred to moral turpitude jurisprudence as an “amorphous morass.”4
And most recently in 2016, Judge Richard Posner stated, “It is 
preposterous that that stale, antiquated, and, worse, meaningless phrase 
should continue to be a part of American Law.”5 Despite these criticisms, 
the term moral turpitude persists throughout modern immigration law.6
Under current federal statutes, a conviction for a crime involving moral 
turpitude (CIMT) can result in severe consequences for an alien living in 
the United States.7
                                                                                                                     
1. Prior to the publication of this Note, the BIA complied with the Attorney General’s 
direction to articulate a uniform standard for determining whether a particular criminal offense is 
a CIMT. See Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016). The BIA concluded that the 
categorical and modified categorical approaches should be used for the CIMT inquiry. Id. at 827. 
As to which categorical test is appropriate, the BIA stated that the realistic-probability test will be 
applied to determine whether an offense categorically qualified as a CIMT “unless controlling 
circuit law expressly dictates otherwise.” Id. at 832. Given that the BIA has spoken directly on 
the CIMT question, this Note can be read to better understand why the BIA reached the decision 
that it did.
2. Restriction of Immigration: Hearing on H.R. 10384 Before the Comm. on Immigration 
& Naturalization, 64th Cong. 8 (1916) (statement of Rep. Adolph J. Sabath).
3. Quilodran-Brau v. Holland, 232 F.2d 183, 184 (3d Cir. 1956).
4. Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 409 (3d Cir. 2005).
5. Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring).
6. See infra notes 9−11 and accompanying text. Moral turpitude has previously been used 
in a range of areas such as defamation, evidence law, voting rights, juror qualification, and 
professional licensing; however, it remains most prevalent in immigration law. Julia Ann Simon-
Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1001−02. 
7. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (“The court has stated that 
‘deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.’” (quoting 
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948))).
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Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)8 an alien convicted 
of a CIMT can be denied entry to the United States,9 deported,10 or 
rendered ineligible for certain forms of immigration relief.11 These 
consequences have been described as a sort of “collateral sanctioning 
mechanism,” where aliens suffer immigration consequences in addition 
to the penalty for the underlying offense.12 With such harsh penalties at 
stake, one might hope that a clear standard exists for determining whether 
a crime is a CIMT.13 Unfortunately, that is not the case, and the CIMT 
inquiry continues to be a source of confusion for courts and practitioners 
across the country.14 Separation-of-power concerns present one 
roadblock to standardization.15 And because criminal codes differ by 
state, Congress has abstained from creating one exhaustive list of 
CIMTs.16 Without definitive answers, courts have turned to common law
tests to determine whether specific state law convictions qualify as 
CIMTs.17 These various tests have resulted in inconsistency and 
                                                                                                                     
8. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012).
10. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
11. See, e.g., id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (rendering the alien ineligible for cancellation of 
removal).
12. Simon-Kerr, supra note 6, at 1040.
13. It has previously been suggested that the term “crimes involving moral turpitude” 
lacked sufficiently definite standards and was therefore void for vagueness. Jordan, 341 U.S. at
229. However, in 1951, the Supreme Court arguably closed the door to that argument, stating in 
dicta that the language of the statute conveyed a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed 
conduct in cases involving fraud. Id. at 231. The vagueness argument has not been raised in less 
“obvious cases.” Id. at 232.
14. See Anthony Guidice, Is a Crime One Involving Moral Turpitude? You Have an Answer 
– Silva-Trevino? The Devil You Have!, 12-05 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 1 (2012) (“People with years
and years of experience cannot agree on how to attack a monster like this CIMT idea—one having 
no clear methodology or genuine clarity.”).
15. See infra Section III.C (discussing the circuit courts rejection of the Attorney General’s 
attempt to standardize the CIMT inquiry). In addition, the Chevron doctrine directs federal courts 
to give deference to the BIA’s definition of CIMT under the INA, however, federal courts review 
de novo the BIA’s evaluation of a state criminal statute. Ruiz–Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513, 516 
(6th Cir. 2012); Rodriquez–Castro v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2007).
16. See Brian C. Harms, Redefining “Crimes of Moral Turpitude”: A Proposal to Congress,
15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 280 (2001) (stating that efficiency and flexibility concerns have likely 
prevented Congress from developing one exhaustive list of CIMTs). Compare this to the similarly 
ambiguous term “aggravated felony” used in immigration law, where Congress has adopted a 
listing approach. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012). However, in 2016, the Tenth Circuit held 
that a portion of the INA’s listing definition of “aggravated felonies” was unconstitutionally 
vague. Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016).
17. See infra Part II.
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confusion across the country in how criminal convictions should be 
classified for immigration purposes.18
Consider, for example, the crime of false use of a Social Security 
number.19 Where employment is increasingly conditioned on completion 
of I-9 verification, it is not unusual for aliens to use fraudulent Social 
Security numbers to obtain work.20 This was the case for Octavia 
Beltran–Tirado, a native and citizen of Mexico, who fled her country at 
eighteen to come to the United States.21 Beltran–Tirado initially used a 
fraudulent Social Security number to obtain employment, and over the 
course of the next twenty years, continued to use the Social Security 
number to work, pay taxes, and buy a house.22 Beltran–Tirado was 
eventually arrested and convicted for fraudulent use of a Social Security 
number.23 After being issued an order of removal, Beltran–Tirado applied 
for relief based on a provision of law designed to regularize the status of 
long-resident aliens illegally in the country.24 However, the grant of this 
relief was conditioned on a finding of good moral character, the definition 
of which excluded anyone convicted of a CIMT.25 After a lower court 
denied Beltran–Tirado relief based on a finding that her conviction 
constituted a CIMT, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, holding that the crime was not a CIMT, reasoning that false use 
of a Social Security number is malum prohibitum and the crime was 
                                                                                                                     
18. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 235 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is universal 
recognition that moral turpitude is an “undefined and undefinable standard”); Arias v. Lynch, 834 
F.3d 823, 829 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing the difficulty courts have had in defining the 
boundaries of moral turpitude); Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 1988) (referring to moral 
turpitude as a nebulous concept).
19. Federal law has codified various offenses relating to the fraudulent use of a Social 
Security number; however, a finding of guilt can typically be predicated on the same underlying 
facts—as in a false attestation on an employment verification form for the purpose of obtaining 
employment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b)(3) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7) (2012).
20. See Thomas Ahearn, DOJ Significantly Increases Fines for Form I-9 Violations, ESR
NEWS BLOG (July 20, 2016), http://www.esrcheck.com/wordpress/2016/07/20/doj-significantly-
increases-fines-for-form-i-9-violations/. For an interesting discussion on undocumented 
immigrants’ “unfair decision” between starving and lying upon entrance to the United States, see
Carlos Cano, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: A Call for Congressional Clarification and the 
“Use of a False Social Security Number” Exception, 60 LOY. L. REV. 815, 847–50 (2014).
21. Beltran–Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2000).
22. Id. at 1182.
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 1183.
25. Id. This requirement is typical of immigration relief provisions, many of which are 
either conditioned on admissibility or require good moral character, the definition of which 
precludes anyone convicted of a CIMT. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (2012) (stating that no person 
shall be regarded as having good moral character who is a member of the classes of persons 
described in section 1182(a)(2)(A)); id. § 1182(a)(2)(A) (describing aliens who have been 
convicted of CIMTs as inadmissible).
4
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committed only “to further otherwise legal behavior.”26 This Ninth 
Circuit decision stands in stark contrast to opinions on the same issue in 
the Fifth,27 Sixth,28 Seventh,29 and Eighth30 Circuits, all finding that 
fraudulent use of a Social Security number is a CIMT, and therefore 
carries all the consequences of a CIMT conviction. This is just one 
example of the inconsistency and ambiguity that plagues the CIMT 
inquiry.
While calls to standardize this area of the law are nothing new, what 
has changed are the express priorities of the executive branch. President 
Donald J. Trump has repeatedly advocated for the deportation of all 
criminal aliens, and his campaign promises highlighted a tougher stance 
on immigration.31 In a campaign speech in Arizona, Trump stated,
“According to federal data, there are at least 2 million, 2 million, think of 
it, criminal aliens now inside of our country, 2 million people criminal 
aliens. We will begin moving them out day one.”32 On January 25, 2017, 
President Trump acted on these promises, issuing an executive order 
directing the Department of Homeland Security to prioritize for removal 
aliens who have been convicted of any criminal offense.33
                                                                                                                     
26. Beltran–Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1184. Note that CIMT jurisprudence has historically 
distinguished between crimes that are malum in se and malum prohibitum, finding that only the 
former meets the definition of CIMT. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 379 n.21 
(1985) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). 
27. E.g., Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
28. E.g., Serrato–Soto v. Holder, 570 F.3d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 2009).
29. E.g., Marin–Rodriquez v. Holder, 710 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2013).
30. E.g., Guardado–Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2010).
31. Stephen Collinson & Jeremy Diamond, Trump on Immigration: No Amnesty, No Pivot,
CNN (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/politics/donald-trump-immigration-
speech/index.html.
32. Phillip Bump, Here’s What Donald Trump Said in His Big Immigration Speech, 
Annotated, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/
2016/08/31/heres-what-donald-trump-said-in-his-big-immigration-speech-annotated/?utm_term
=.b86cb18a458c.
33. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in 
the Interior of the United States (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/01/25/presidential-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united. See also 
Liz Robbins & Caitlin Dickerson, Immigration Agents Arrest 600 People Across U.S. in One 
Week, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2017), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/02/12/nyregion/
immigration-arrests-sanctuary-city.html?referer=http://m.facebook.com (reporting that federal 
immigration officials arrested over 600 people in the weeks following President Trump’s 
executive order defining new enforcement priorities); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Feb. 12, 2017, 3:34 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
830741932099960834 (“The crackdown on illegal criminals is merely the keeping of my 
campaign promise. Gang members, drug dealers & others are being removed!”).
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This executive order marks a drastic shift from President Barack 
Obama’s previous enforcement priorities, which were limited to 
undocumented immigrants who threatened public safety or national 
security, had ties to criminal gang activity, committed serious felony 
offenses, or were habitual misdemeanor criminal offenders.34 The 
importance of this change is underpinned by budgetary constraints, which 
generally limit removal to only those aliens who qualify as enforcement 
priorities.35 This means that aliens with convictions for lesser crimes, who 
did not previously qualify as enforcement priorities and were therefore 
likely to receive prosecutorial discretion, will now receive removal orders 
if brought to the attention of authorities. And in line with this increased 
enforcement, we are likely to see a proportional increase in applications 
for relief, the grant of which is often conditioned on the applicant having 
no prior CIMT convictions.36
It is because of this change in policy and priorities that it is more 
important than ever to address the problems that have beleaguered CIMT 
jurisprudence. Where removal of undocumented aliens could potentially 
increase in coming years, it is important that aliens facing this difficult 
process are met with a fair and consistent legal system. In an effort to 
address this issue, Part I of this Note examines the background and 
history of the term CIMT. Part II discusses the various approaches circuit 
courts adopted to determine whether a conviction qualifies as a CIMT. 
Part III addresses the three-step framework articulated by the Attorney 
General in Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino I)37 and the circuit court’s 
subsequent responses and eventual rejection of the approach. Part IV 
discusses the Attorney General’s decision to vacate Silva-Trevino I and 
concludes by suggesting a framework the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) should adopt to promulgate consistency across the circuits.  
I. BACKGROUND
The term moral turpitude has been used in immigration law for over 
a hundred years.38 Congress first included the term in 1891, “and it was
                                                                                                                     
34. Memorandum from Sec’y Jeh Charles Johnson on Policies for the Apprehension, 
Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants 3−4 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.p
df.
35. See Kristina Gasson, Which Undocumented Persons Are Helped by Prosecutorial 
Discretion, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/which-undocumented-persons-are-
helped-by-prosecutorial-discretion.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). 
36. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
37. 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), vacated by Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 550 
(A.G. 2015).
38. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951).
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adopted without comment in the accompanying reports.”39 Subsequent 
revisions of immigration law have not added clarity to the term. Nowhere 
in the INA does Congress explicitly define moral turpitude.40 In addition, 
legislative history is silent as to Congress’s intent.41
Left with ambiguous language, dictionary definitions can help guide 
our understanding of what is meant by a CIMT. Modern dictionary 
definitions of turpitude include a very evil quality or way of behaving,42
“depravity or wickedness,”43 and “depraved or wicked behavior or 
character.”44 Black’s Law Dictionary defines moral turpitude as “conduct 
that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality.”45 These definitions 
appear consistent with congressional reports discussing the general goals 
of immigration law at the time moral turpitude was first included in 
immigration statutes: “[T]he intent of our immigration laws is not to 
restrict immigration, but to sift it, to separate the desirable from the 
undesirable immigrants, and to permit only those to land on our shores 
who have certain . . . moral qualities.”46 However, with thousands of 
criminal statutes,47 difficulties have arisen in differentiating between 
which crimes signal the presence of “undesirable moral qualities” and 
which do not. 
In seeking to effectuate Congress’s intent, courts have refined their 
own definitions of moral turpitude. The Fifth Circuit defines moral 
turpitude as conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently 
base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and 
the duties between persons or to society in general.48 Adding to that, 
moral turpitude has been described as an act, “which is per se morally 
reprehensible and intrinsically wrong or malum in se, so it is the nature 
                                                                                                                     
39. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER 
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 10 (Comm. 
Print 1988). 
40. Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1994).
41. Id. at 194–95.
42. Turpitude, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/turpitude
(last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
43. Turpitude, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=
1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=turpitude (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
44. Turpitude, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
turpitude (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
45. Moral Turpitude, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1999).
46. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 39.
47. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation’s Federal 
Criminal Laws, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304319804576389601079728920.
48. Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1996).
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of the act itself and not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a 
crime one of moral turpitude.”49
Over time, practitioners have grouped crimes together to better 
recognize which convictions typically involve moral turpitude.50 Certain 
groupings have universally been recognized as CIMTs.51 Courts have 
consistently held that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves 
moral turpitude.52 This includes a variety of conduct including issuing 
checks with the intent to defraud,53 using the mail to defraud,54 forgery 
with intent to defraud,55 concealing assets in bankruptcy,56 and intent to 
defraud the United States.57
In addition, courts have held that crimes against the person involve 
moral turpitude when the statute requires malicious intention or the 
equivalent of such intention.58 Examples of statutes that typically require 
the necessary intent element include murder,59 voluntary manslaughter,60
kidnapping,61 assault with intent to kill,62 and assault with intent to rape.63
Crimes against property similarly turn on whether the statute requires 
intent to deprive, defraud, or destroy.64 Typically only aggravated sexual 
offenses involve moral turpitude, while minor sexual offenses do not.65
Regulatory violations are generally not CIMTs, because they lack the 
requisite level of moral condemnation.66 Finally, conspiracy to commit a 
                                                                                                                     
49. Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980).
50. See Maryellen Fullerton & Noah Kinigstein, Strategies for Ameliorating the 
Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: A Guide for Defense Attorneys, 23 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 425, 433 (1986).
51. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951).
52. Id.
53. United States ex rel. Portada v. Day, 16 F.2d 328, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
54. Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F. Supp. 736, 737–38 (D. Mass. 1934).
55. United States ex rel. Popoff v. Reimer, 79 F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1935).
56. United States ex rel. Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F.2d 57, 57–58 (8th Cir. 1928). 
57. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 229.
58. Awaijane, 14 I. & N. Dec. 117, 118 (B.I.A. 1972); Fullerton & Kinigstein, supra note
50, at 433.
59. See, e.g., Lopez-Amaro, 20 I. & N. Dec. 668, 673 (B.I.A. 1993).
60. See, e.g., De Lucia v. Flagg, 297 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel. 
Sollano v. Doak, 5 F. Supp. 561, 565 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
61. See, e.g., Nakoi, 14 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 1972); P-----, 5 I. & N. Dec. 444, 
446–47 (B.I.A. 1953).
62. See, e.g., C-----, 5 I. & N. Dec. 370, 375 (B.I.A. 1953).
63. See, e.g., Beato, 10 I. & N. Dec. 730, 733, 735 (B.I.A. 1964).
64. See Khalik, 17 I. & N. Dec. 518, 519 (B.I.A. 1980). 
65. See R-----, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 454 (B.I.A. 1954). This division is helpful in illustrating 
the difference between a crime and a crime involving moral turpitude. In the latter, society must 
morally condemn the underlying action that constituted a violation of the statute.
66. See Fullerton & Kinigstein, supra note 50, at 436.
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crime is typically considered a CIMT only if the underlying offense 
involves moral turpitude.67
II. PRE-SILVA-TREVINO I APPROACH
While it is easy to conclude that crimes such as murder and rape 
involve moral turpitude, there are numerous crimes for which the CIMT 
inquiry is not nearly as clear-cut.68 Prior to the Attorney General’s 
decision in Silva-Trevino I each circuit court applied its own body of case 
law to determine whether a specific conviction qualified as a CIMT.69
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to detail all of the approaches 
the circuit courts employed, the following section will discuss some of 
the major variations of the CIMT inquiry used prior to Silva-Trevino I.
Traditionally courts employed some form of the categorical approach 
to determine whether a conviction qualified as a CIMT.70 The categorical 
approach focuses on the inherent nature of the conviction, rather than the 
specific facts.71 “Immigration law adjudicators aspire to employ a 
uniform and strictly ‘legal’ methodology” for determining whether a 
crime involves moral turpitude.72 The idea that the moral turpitude 
inquiry should not involve specific facts is one of the basic tenets of the
categorical approach, which “stood as [a] pillar[] of immigration law for 
at least seventy years.”73 The categorical approach can generally be 
                                                                                                                     
67. See, e.g., Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 228 (B.I.A. 1980).
68. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Recent Court 
Opinions, 9 IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, Apr. 2015 at 6, https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/05/01/vol9no4_final.pdf (noting a circuit split as to 
whether misprision of felony is a crime involving moral turpitude); Kelly Knaub, BIA Wants Input 
on Whether Cockfighting Is Moral Turpitude, LAW360 (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/887731/bia-wants-input-on-whether-cockfighting-is-moral-
turpitude (reporting that the BIA has asked for public comment on whether cockfighting should 
be considered a CIMT).
69. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693 (A.G. 2008), vacated by Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 550, 550 (A.G. 2015). 
70. Brief for Catholic Charities of Dallas et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), (No. 11-60464) (listing cases from the Supreme 
Court, circuit courts, and the BIA applying some form of the categorical approach); Jennifer Lee 
Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1831 (2013) (finding that adjudicators have 
used the categorical approach for over a century to assess whether a particular conviction triggers 
removability). 
71. Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving Moral 
Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 324 (2011). See also Rebecca Sharpless, 
Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration 
Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 993 (2008) (noting that the categorical method prohibits 
consideration of the underlying circumstances that gave rise to the conviction).
72. Sharpless, supra note 71.
73. Id.
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broken down into two steps: the traditional categorical approach and the 
modified categorical approach.74
A. Step One: The Traditional Categorical Approach
The first step of the traditional categorical approach considers 
whether moral turpitude “necessarily inheres” in a conviction under a 
particular statute.75 Essentially this step asks if every conviction under
the particular statute would involve moral turpitude.76 After looking to 
the elements of the statute, if the answer is yes, then every conviction 
under the statute will be a CIMT with no further inquiry into the specific 
facts of the conviction. The majority of the circuits split between three 
tests to determine whether a particular statute necessarily involves moral 
turpitude: the least-culpable-conduct test, the common-case approach, or 
the realistic-probability test.77 The difference between these tests lies in 
how the court analyzes the underlying criminal statute to determine 
whether the statute categorically involves moral turpitude.
1. Least-Culpable-Conduct Test
The least-culpable-conduct test asks whether an examination of the 
statute reveals that even the minimum conduct that could hypothetically 
permit a conviction necessarily involves moral turpitude.78 If the least 
culpable conduct that could sustain a conviction under that statute
involves moral turpitude, then the statute is categorically a CIMT.79 The 
least-culpable-conduct test in no way considers the actual conduct of the 
alien.80 Instead, the courts look for any hypothetical fact pattern that 
could sustain a conviction under the statute, and if one can be found that 
does not involve moral turpitude, then the statute is not categorically a
CIMT under step one.81 The Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have 
                                                                                                                     
74. Dadhania, supra note 71, at 324.
75. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693. See also Dadhania, supra note 71, at 326.
76. See Sharpless, supra note 71, at 993–94 (stating that the categorical approach prohibits 
consideration of the underlying facts of a conviction, and requires adjudicators to “categorically” 
determine whether the crime triggers removal).
77. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693–94; Dadhania, supra note 71, at 326.
78. Some courts have referred to this as the “minimum conduct test” but the underlying 
analysis is essentially the same. See Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“Under the categorical approach, we look only to the minimum criminal conduct necessary to 
satisfy the essential elements of the crime, not the particular circumstances of the defendant’s 
conduct.”). This Note will refer to this type of analysis as the least-culpable-conduct test. 
79. E.g., Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2005). 
80. Id. (“Whether an alien’s crime involves moral turpitude is determined by the criminal 
statute and the record of conviction, not the alien’s conduct.”).
81. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 695. 
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all adopted this test in some form,82 although more recently the Ninth 
Circuit appears to have moved towards the realistic-probability 
approach.83 The least-culpable-conduct test has been criticized as 
potentially underinclusive, allowing aliens to avoid CIMT penalties for 
crimes that did in fact involve moral turpitude because some hypothetical 
situation exists where a conviction under the same statute would not 
involve the same level of moral condemnation.84
2. Common-Case Approach
In contrast, the common-case approach to step one of the traditional
categorical approach looks to whether moral turpitude inheres in the usual
or general nature of the statute at issue. The test requires the court to 
consider whether the common conviction under the statute would involve 
moral turpitude.85 The First and Eighth Circuits appear to have both 
adopted some form of this approach.86 The common-case approach has 
been criticized as potentially overinclusive, allowing judges to apply 
CIMT penalties to aliens whose particular crimes did not actually involve 
moral turpitude.87
                                                                                                                     
82. See, e.g., Mendez, 547 F.3d at 348 (“Under the categorical approach, we look to the 
minimum criminal conduct necessary to satisfy the essential elements of the crime . . . .”);
Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Under the categorical approach, we 
read the statute at its minimum, taking into account ‘the minimum conduct necessary to sustain a 
conviction under the statute.’”); Fernandez–Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“‘[T]he issue is . . . whether the full range of conduct encompassed by the statute constitutes a 
crime of moral turpitude.” (alteration in original)); Partyka, 417 F.3d at 411 (“Under this 
categorical approach, we read the applicable statute to ascertain the least culpable conduct 
necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute.”).
83. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
84. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 695 (“Such an analysis would require a judge to 
refrain from applying those provisions with respect to criminal offenses that do involve moral 
turpitude if the judge simply hypothesizes some theoretical situation in which the statute might be 
applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude.”); see also Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 
1022, 1027 (8th Cir. 1971) (Eisele, J., dissenting) (“I cannot believe that Congress intended for 
[persons who have actually committed crimes involving moral turpitude] to be allowed to remain 
simply because there might have been no moral turpitude in the commission by other individuals 
(real or hypothetical) of crimes described by the wording of the same statute under an identical 
indictment.”).
85. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696. 
86. “If the crime in its general nature is one which in common usage would be classified as 
a crime involving moral turpitude” then the court may find that the crime categorically involves 
moral turpitude. Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237, 245 (1st Cir. 1954), rev’d on other grounds, Pino 
v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955) (per curiam); see Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 
1971).
87. See Marciano, 450 F.3d at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (“The statute says deportation 
shall follow when the crime committed involves moral turpitude, not when that type of crime 
‘commonly’ or ‘usually’ does.”).
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3. Realistic-Probability Test
In an effort to address the shortcomings of the minimum-conduct and 
common-case approaches, some circuits have recently adopted the 
realistic-probability test. The realistic-probability test asks whether moral 
turpitude necessarily inheres in all cases that have a realistic probability 
of being prosecuted.88 The U.S. Supreme Court laid out this test in 
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez,89 allowing courts to focus on the actual 
scope of the statute, rather than hypothetical conduct, theoretically 
addressing over- and under-inclusivity concerns. Although not 
specifically considering the CIMT question, the Court in Duenas-Alvarez
addressed how to best determine whether a state conviction warrants 
secondary immigration consequences. Specifically, the Court stated:
[T]o find that state statute creates a crime outside the generic 
definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more 
than the application of legal imagination to a state statute’s 
language. It requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical 
possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct 
falling outside the generic definition of a crime. To show that 
realistic probability, an offender, of course, may show that 
the statute was so applied in his own case. But he must at 
least point to his own case or other cases in which the state 
courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) 
manner for which he argues.90
Following Duenas-Alvarez, courts adopting the realistic-probability 
test have required aliens arguing that a statute is not categorically a CIMT 
to provide evidence of an actual case where the statute at issue was used 
to prosecute conduct not involving moral turpitude. While the Supreme 
Court did not specify what evidence could be used to make this showing, 
the Ninth Circuit has allowed factual evidence of actual convictions, 
unpublished and non-precedential opinions, statutory language and the 
logic of published opinions, or some combination thereof to do so.91
                                                                                                                     
88. Nicanor–Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other 
grounds, Marmolejo–Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009); Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. at 696–97.
89. 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007). This test was initially adopted in the context of aggravated 
felonies; however, it has since been applied to the moral-turpitude inquiry. See Nicanor–Romero,
523 F.3d at 1004−05.
90. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193.
91. Nicanor–Romero, 523 F.3d at 1005.
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B. Step Two: The Modified Categorical Approach
If after the step-one analysis a criminal statute is ambiguous as to 
whether all convictions under it necessarily involve moral turpitude, 
courts typically proceed to step two, the modified categorical approach.92
Some circuits have rejected the step-two inquiry entirely, refusing to 
allow immigration judges to inquire into any specific facts of a case.93
However, for the majority that do proceed, step two allows the courts to 
go beyond the mere fact of conviction and examine other information 
such as the indictment, jury instructions, charging documents, or plea 
agreements to see if any pertinent information can be added to the moral-
turpitude inquiry.94 There is no one universally accepted definition of 
what the modified categorical approach allows a court to look at, and the 
circuits differ as to what kinds of evidence they will consider beyond the 
language of the statute itself.95
Circuits also disagree over when a court should proceed to the 
modified categorical inquiry.96 Even within the same circuit, there appear 
to be conflicting opinions as to when a court should consider evidence 
beyond the statute. In 1999, the First Circuit allowed the immigration 
court to “refer to the record of conviction, meaning the charge 
(indictment), plea, verdict, and sentence” in ascertaining exactly what 
criminal conduct an alien had pled guilty to, even when the statutory 
language appeared clear.97 However, just one year later, the First Circuit 
indicated that the step-two inquiry is only appropriate where “the 
statute . . . includes both crimes of moral turpitude and others,” signaling 
that the step-two inquiry is only appropriate if the plain language of the 
statute is ambiguous.98 This type of confusion as to the use of the 
modified categorical inquiry is not unique to the First Circuit.99
In considering when to proceed to step two, a majority of courts limit 
the modified categorical approach to cases where the conviction at issue 
                                                                                                                     
92. Dadhania, supra note 71, at 324.
93. See Rodriquez–Castro v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2005) (ending the moral 
turpitude inquiry after the step one traditional categorical approach); Rodriguez–Herrera v. INS, 
52 F.3d 238, 239 (9th Cir. 1995) (ending the moral turpitude inquiry after the step one traditional 
categorical approach).
94. See Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 187.
95. Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2006).
96. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 694 (A.G. 2008), vacated by Silva-Trevino, 26 I. 
& N. Dec. 550 (A.G. 2015).
97. Maghsoudi v. INS, 181 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 1999). 
98. Montero–Ubri v. INS, 229 F.3d 319, 321 (1st Cir. 2000).
99. See Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (“The circumstances under which courts that 
permit a second-stage inquiry will allow that inquiry to proceed, and the facts they will consider 
in such an inquiry, also vary widely.”).
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is based on a divisible statute.100 Where a statute is structured in outline 
form with multiple subsections, it may be necessary to proceed beyond a 
pure categorical inquiry.101 The majority of courts limit the second-step 
inquiry to this narrow purpose of ascertaining under what portion of a 
statute an alien was convicted.102 When an alien is convicted under a 
consolidated statute, a theft statute for example,103 it becomes necessary 
for the factfinder to look beyond the plain language of the statute, which 
contains both CIMTs and non-CIMTs, to determine whether further 
immigration penalties are warranted by the relevant subsection the alien 
was actually convicted under. Failing to conduct the second-step inquiry 
in these instances would likely result in underinclusiveness of CIMT 
penalties, contrary to Congress’s intent. 
III. ATTORNEY GENERAL MUKASEY’S FAILED ATTEMPT 
TO STANDARDIZE
After surveying the various circuit approaches to the CIMT inquiry, 
what is left is “a patchwork application of the law—with the most
profound decisions affecting aliens . . . tied to the mere happenstance of 
where their cases arise geographically.”104 This inconsistency is directly 
contrary to the much-emphasized goal of national uniformity of federal 
law.105 And perhaps, at its worst, it runs contrary to the United States 
                                                                                                                     
100. See Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e departed from a 
strict categorical analysis only where the statute of conviction featured disjunctive 
variations . . . .”); Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) (considering the 
record of conviction only if the statute of conviction is divisible into multiple subsections); Singh 
v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 162 (3d Cir. 2004).
101. Singh, 383 F.3d at 162. This additional step seems to better reflect the probable intent 
of Congress because “it would seem strange to think that Congress intended the application of the 
categorical approach to turn on the typography used by the statute’s drafters.” Id. at 163.
102. Dadhania, supra note 71, at 331. See, e.g., Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1184 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (“When a statute is divisible into several crimes, some of which may involve moral 
turpitude and some not, it is appropriate to examine the ‘record of conviction’ to determine which 
part applies to the defendant.”); United States v. Martinez–Hernandez, 422 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (“When the underlying statute reaches a broad range of conduct, some of which merits 
an enhancement and some of which does not, courts resolve the resulting ambiguity by consulting 
reliable judicial records, such as charging document, plea agreement, or plea colloquy.”).
103. Practically every state has consolidated all common law theft crimes under one unified 
crime, demonstrating the prevalence of consolidated criminal statutes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 484, 490(a) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1)(a)–(b) (2016); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 155.05(2)(a)–(d) (McKinney 2016); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (b)(1)–(3) (West 2016).
104. Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399, 408 (B.I.A.), superseded by regulation on other grounds as 
stated in Sadighi v. Lynch, 670 F. App’x 446 (9th Cir. 2016).
105. See, e.g., Cazarez–Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 912 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(emphasizing the importance of national uniformity in immigration law). 
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Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall have Power 
To . . . establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”106
A. Silva-Trevino 3-Step Approach
In an attempt to provide guidance and consistency to this “fractured 
approach,” in 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey articulated a 
new framework to be applied by all courts.107 In Silva-Trevino I the 
Attorney General laid out a three-step test for determining whether a 
crime is a CIMT.108 Some regarded this new test as drastically departing 
from firmly established law in this area.109
In Silva-Trevino I the alien was a native and citizen of Mexico who 
was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 
1962.110 The alien entered a plea of no contest to the criminal offense of 
indecency with a child.111 The following year the Department of 
Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the alien.112
The alien requested discretionary relief from removal, which required 
that he have no CIMT convictions.113 He argued that his conviction for 
indecency with a child should not be considered a CIMT because the 
relevant statute did not require “that a person have knowledge that the 
individual with whom the perpetrator has sexual contact is a child” and 
thus allowed for convictions where the perpetrator lacked the requisite 
intent for a crime involving moral turpitude.114
The Attorney General began his analysis of the case with the statutory 
text of the INA.115 Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), defining admissibility,
provides that “any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, 
or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements 
of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political 
                                                                                                                     
106. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (emphasis added).
107. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 695 (A.G. 2008), vacated by Silva-Trevino, 26 I. 
& N. Dec. 550 (A.G. 2015).
108. Id. at 708.
109. Dadhania, supra note 71, at 314. 
110. Silvia-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 691. This timeline reflects the typical process leading up to removal proceedings 
following a criminal conviction. Law enforcement agencies throughout the country participate in 
joint programs with immigration officials, where law enforcement refers cases to immigration 
officials when they become aware that they have arrested an undocumented alien. See FED’N FOR 
AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, THE ROLE OF STATE & LOCAL ENFORCEMENT IN IMMIGRATION 
MATTERS AND REASONS TO RESIST SANCTUARY POLICIES, 1–2 (2016), http://www.fairus.org/
DocServer/state_local/IssueBrief_Cooperation_and_Anti-SanctuaryPolicy.pdf. 
113. Silvia-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 691.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 692.
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offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime” is 
inadmissible.116 In what appears to be an effort to head off challenges 
under the Chevron doctrine, the Attorney General stated:
The statute does not define the term “crime involving 
moral turpitude.” It is also silent on the precise method that
immigration judges and courts should use to determine if a 
prior conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude. To 
the extent it suggests a method, the text actually cuts in 
different directions. Some statutory language—for example, 
use of the phrase “convicted of” rather than “committed”—
suggests that the relevant inquiry should be categorical and 
focus on whether moral turpitude inheres in the statutory 
elements required for conviction rather than in the 
particularized facts of the alien’s crime. Other language—
for example, use of the word “involving” and the reference 
in section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) to aliens who admit 
“committing” certain “acts”—seems to call for, or at least 
allow, inquiry into the particularized facts of the crime.117 
Addressing the ambiguity of the statutory text, the Attorney General 
noted that courts have long begun the moral turpitude inquiry with some 
form of “categorical” test, although no one preferred methodology has 
been adopted across the circuits.118 The Attorney General found that there 
was even more confusion among the circuits in what, if anything, 
followed the categorical inquiry.119 Concerned with the “patchwork” 
approach among the different circuits and noting the fundamental effects 
immigration laws have on individuals, the Attorney General articulated a 
new three-prong approach to determine whether a crime is a CIMT, in 
hopes of promulgating consistency across the courts.120
The Attorney General held that the first step of the moral-turpitude 
inquiry requires a categorical review of the statute of conviction to 
determine whether there is a “realistic probability” that the state or federal 
criminal statute at issue could ever be applied to reach conduct that does 
not involve moral turpitude.121 If there is no realistic probability that the 
statute would ever catch conduct not involving moral turpitude, then any 
conviction under the statute is necessarily a CIMT and the inquiry 
ends.122 In adopting the realistic-probability approach to the categorical 
                                                                                                                     
116. Id.
117. Id. at 693 (citations omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 694.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 698.
122. See id.
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inquiry, the Attorney General rejected the least-culpable-conduct test 
used by the Third and Fifth Circuits and the common-case approach used 
by the First and Eighth Circuits.123
If the categorical inquiry does not resolve the issue, the Attorney 
General directed that the courts should engage in a modified categorical 
inquiry and examine the record of conviction, jury instructions, a signed 
guilty plea, and the plea transcript to see if any such documents support 
a conclusive finding that the conduct underlying the alien’s conviction
involved moral turpitude.124 The Attorney General reasoned that the 
traditional categorical approach was poorly equipped to resolve cases 
where the statute of conviction encompasses both conduct that involves 
moral turpitude and conduct that does not.125 The Attorney General 
explicitly stated that adjudicators should engage in such a second-stage 
inquiry when necessary, signaling to circuit courts which had previously 
refused to go beyond the first step to adjust their approach accordingly.126
Last, if the record of conviction proves inconclusive, the Attorney 
General directed courts to consider any additional evidence deemed 
necessary and appropriate to accurately resolve the moral-turpitude 
question.127 The Attorney General emphasized that the third step need not 
be a burdensome inquiry, noting that questioning the alien about his 
knowledge and intent at the time of the crime might be sufficient.128 This 
addition of a third step was a dramatic change in long established, yet 
inconsistent, moral-turpitude jurisprudence.129 Commentators have gone 
so far as to describe the new framework as “eviscerat[ing] the categorical 
nature of the CIMT inquiry.”130
B. Post-Silva-Trevino I Discord
Silva-Trevino I elicited varied responses. Contrary to goals of unity, 
federal circuit courts split on whether to follow the decision of the 
Attorney General or to continue applying their own established common 
law tests. Two circuits fully accepted Silva-Trevino I’s three-step 
framework.131 Both the Seventh and Eight Circuits rejected the 
formalistic approach taken by their sister circuits, and permitted 
                                                                                                                     
123. Id. at 693–94. 
124. Id. at 698–99.
125. Id. at 698. 
126. See id.
127. Id. at 699.
128. Id. at 709.
129. See supra Part II (excluding any mention of a third step in the CIMT inquiry). 
130. Dadhania, supra note 71, at 314. 
131. See Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2014); Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 
F.3d 1052, 1059 (8th Cir. 2012).
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consideration of evidence under step three of Silva-Trevino I.132
However, neither court detailed its reasoning for following the new 
procedure.133 Some circuits never considered whether to adopt the Silva-
Trevino I three-step approach.134 The Third,135 Fourth,136 and Fifth137
Circuits refused to apply the entire approach. Other circuits, such as the 
Eleventh, chose to follow Silva-Trevino I only to a limited extent by 
adopting the realistic-probability test as the first step in the categorical 
inquiry.138
C. Chevron Rejection of Silva-Trevino I
In 2009, the Third Circuit was the first to decline to follow the three-
step approach articulated in Silva-Trevino I.139 In Jean–Louis v. Attorney 
General,140 the Third Circuit concluded that they were not bound by 
Silva-Trevino I because “it is bottomed on an impermissible reading of 
the statute, which, we believe, speaks with requisite clarity. The 
ambiguity that the Attorney General perceives in the INA is an ambiguity 
of his own making, not grounded in the text of the statute.”141 The court 
went on to meticulously describe the inconsistencies between the 
Attorney General’s three-step approach and over a century of moral-
turpitude jurisprudence.142 The Third Circuit cited Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council143 multiple times; however, the court 
did not go through an in-depth Chevron analysis, instead relying on years 
of precedent to reject Silva-Trevino I.144
                                                                                                                     
132. See Sanchez, 757 F.3d at 720; Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1056; Mata–Guerro v. Holder, 
627 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 2010)
133. Sanchez, 757 F.3d at 720 (remanding for application of the three-step framework); 
Bobadilla, 679 F.3d at 1056 (remanding for application of the three-step framework).
134. See Dadhania, supra note 71, at 340.
135. Jean–Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We conclude that 
deference is not owed Silva-Trevino’s novel approach and thus will apply our established 
methodology.”).
136. See Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Thus in a case such as the 
present one in which the only issue is the alien’s prior conviction, the statute unambiguously 
directs that an adjudicator consider only the conviction itself, and not any underlying conduct.”).
137. Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the use of a third 
step in the CIMT inquiry).
138. Destin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 345 F. App’x 485, 487 (11th Cir. 2009) (not reported). 
However, the Eleventh Circuit eventually joined its sister circuits by rejecting the Attorney 
General’s third step. See Fajardo v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011).
139. Jean–Louis, 582 F.3d at 473.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
144. Jean–Louis, 582 F.3d at 473–74.
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In 2012, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Silva-Trevino I three-step 
approach as an unauthorized exercise of the Attorney General’s power, 
this time explicitly under the Chevron doctrine.145 Using a separation-of-
powers argument, the Fourth Circuit found that it was not bound by the 
Attorney General’s interpretation of the appropriate test for CIMT 
inquiries.146 To understand the rejection of Silva-Trevino I, one must 
remember that federal immigration agencies and immigration courts are 
part of the “fourth branch of government,” and therefore subject to the
Chevron doctrine, a pillar of administrative law. 
In Chevron the Supreme Court established the framework for judicial 
review of administrative agencies’ interpretation of statutes.147 When 
determining whether the courts must accord substantial deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers, the first step under 
Chevron is to consider whether “Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.”148 If, using traditional tools of statutory 
construction, the court determines that Congress clearly addressed the 
precise question at issue, then Congress’s clear intention must be given 
effect and no deference is given the agency’s interpretation.149 If the 
statute is ambiguous or silent regarding the precise question, then the 
court proceeds to step two.150 Step two of the Chevron analysis directs 
courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute where it is 
reasonable.151
In applying Chevron to Silva-Trevino I, the Fourth Circuit first had to 
overcome its own precedent, Yousefi v. U.S. INS.152 In Yousefi, the Fourth 
Circuit held that it should defer to the DHS’s determinations regarding 
what type of conduct involved moral turpitude because Congress chose 
not to define moral turpitude in the governing statute.153 This holding, on 
its face, seems to indicate that under Chevron step one, the statute is 
ambiguous as to the meaning of CIMT, and therefore any reasonable 
interpretation by the agency should be given deference by the courts. In 
rejecting Silva-Trevino I, the Fourth Circuit skirted this issue by 
reframing the Chevron issue as not what conduct involves moral turpitude 
under the statute, “but rather what language in the statute informs an 
                                                                                                                     
145. Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 476 (4th Cir. 2012).
146. Id.
147. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 842–43.
150. Id. at 843.
151. Id.
152. 260 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2001).
153. Id. at 326.
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adjudicator of the procedure for determining whether a particular 
conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.”154
After artfully distinguishing precedent and framing the issue, the 
Fourth Circuit applied step one of Chevron and considered whether the 
moral-turpitude statute clearly indicated the process for determining 
whether a particular conviction is a CIMT.155 In analyzing the plain 
language of the statute, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the Attorney 
General’s interpretation in Silva-Trevino I.156 The Fourth Circuit 
distinguished procedure from substance and noted that the issue under the 
Chevron doctrine is not what statutory offense qualifies as a crime 
involving moral turpitude, but rather what language in the statute informs 
courts of the procedure that should be used in the moral turpitude 
inquiry.157 Breaking down the language of the statute, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that the plain language of the statute was not ambiguous as to 
procedure: 
Because the relevant statutory language refers only to 
convictions, not to conduct or to “committing” acts, there is
no uncertainty in the statutory language created by the use of 
the phrase “convicted of” in the same statute as the words 
“committing” and “involving.” Thus, in such a case as the 
present one in which the only issue is the alien’s prior 
conviction, the statute unambiguously directs that an 
adjudicator consider only the conviction itself, and not any 
underlying conduct.158
Finding the plain language unambiguous, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that the Congress’s clear intent controlled the procedure of the 
moral turpitude inquiry and therefore the Silva-Trevino I three-step 
framework was not binding.159
After rejecting Silva-Trevino I, the Fourth Circuit went on to discuss 
why the third step of the Attorney General’s framework was so 
concerning.160 The court reasoned that allowing documents of 
questionable veracity as proof of an alien’s conduct could be problematic 
                                                                                                                     
154. Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 480. 
155. Id.
156. Id. at 481.
157. Id. at 480 (emphasizing the distinction between ambiguity in procedure of the moral 
turpitude inquiry versus ambiguity inherent in the phrase crime involving moral turpitude).
158. Id. at 482. 
159. Id. at 484. Similarly, famed Judge Posner has long voiced his skepticism that the BIA 
is owed any Chevron deference on the definition of moral turpitude, because the BIA has never 
actually defined the term nor molded a definition toward any policy aims in the INA. Mei v. 
Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004).
160. Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 483. 
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and, further, that documents from early in an investigation do not always 
properly account for later events.161 These concerns have been echoed in 
court opinions and scholarly discussions across the country.162
Other circuits soon followed in rejecting Silva-Trevino I under a 
Chevron analysis, including the Fifth,163 Ninth,164 and Eleventh 
Circuits.165 In Olivas–Motta v. Holder,166 the Ninth Circuit declined to 
follow Silva-Trevino I, noting three critical points where the court
disagreed with the Attorney General’s reasoning.167 Citing to Prudencio,
the Ninth Circuit agreed that the Attorney General conflated substantive 
ambiguity for procedural ambiguity and concluded that the statute 
unambiguously only allowed for consideration of the record of 
conviction, not the specific acts that the alien may have committed.168 In 
Olivas–Motta, the Ninth Circuit also joined the Third, Fourth, and 
Eleventh Circuits in finding that a “crime involving moral turpitude” is a 
generic crime whose description is complete unto itself, such that 
“involving moral turpitude” is an element of the crime.169 And because it 
is an element of the generic crime, immigration courts are limited to the 
record of conviction in determining whether an alien has been 
“convicted” of a CIMT.170 To try and put it more simply, the court, 
following its sister circuits, took a formalistic approach to statutory 
construction, reasoning that the word “conviction” clearly indicates 
Congress’s intent as to the procedure for finding a CIMT, and finding the 
subsequent word “involving” to be only an element of a generic crime, 
not enough to open the door to an argument that Congress’s intent in 
                                                                                                                     
161. Id. at 483–84.
162. See Jean–Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 476 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he practical 
evidentiary difficulties and potential unfairness associated with looking behind [an alien’s] 
offense of conviction [are] no less daunting in the immigration [context] than in the sentencing 
context.” (second and fourth alteration in original) (quoting Dulal–Whiteway v. United States, 
501 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2007)); Dadhania, supra note 71, at 353 (calling for the rejection of 
Silva-Trevino I’s third step as an impermissible reading of the statute that will lead to an increase 
in unfairness, inconsistency, and inefficiency in application of CIMT provisions).
163. See Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Attorney 
General’s three-step process as impermissible under Chevron).
164. Olivas–Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 916 (9th Cir. 2013).
165. See Fajardo v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011). While not as explicit 
about which categorical approach it utilizes, the court clearly limits inquiry outside the plain 
language of the statute to the charging document, plea, verdict, and sentence. Id.
166. 746 F.3d at 907.
167. Id. at 911 (disagreeing with the Attorney General’s definitions of “crime involving 
moral turpitude” and “convicted of” and the conclusion that “moral turpitude” is not an element 
of “an offense”). 
168. Id. at 916.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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using “conviction” was ambiguous. Therefore, the consideration of 
evidence outside the conviction record under step three of the Silva-
Trevino I framework is impermissible as inconsistent with Congress’s 
clear intent.171
IV. CURRENT STATE OF THE CIMT INQUIRY
On April 10, 2015, after five circuits rejected the three-step approach, 
Attorney General Eric Holder vacated the opinion in Silva-Trevino I, and 
directed the BIA to address in appropriate cases how “adjudicators are to 
determine whether a particular criminal offense is a crime involving 
moral turpitude” under the INA.172 Acknowledging that five circuits had 
declined to follow Silva-Trevino I on the basis of an impermissible 
reading of the INA, the Attorney General found that Silva-Trevino I had 
not “accomplished its stated goal” of providing uniformity to the moral-
turpitude inquiry.173 The Attorney General also noted that several recent 
Supreme Court decisions might bear on the moral-turpitude inquiry, 
“cast[ing] doubt on the continued validity of the third step of the 
framework.”174 Specifically, Holder cited Carachuri-Rosendo v. 
Holder175 and Moncrieffe v. Holder,176 two Supreme Court decisions 
rejecting the use of the fact-based approach in determining whether a 
particular conviction was an aggravated felony.177
The BIA has yet to act on Holder’s instruction, “leaving a vacuum of 
authority” on how courts should determine whether a crime is a CIMT.178
Since Holder’s vacatur, the BIA has issued only one opinion addressing 
the issue of CIMTs; however, instead of articulating a clear procedure for 
                                                                                                                     
171. Id.
172. Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 553 (A.G. 2015).
173. Id. at 552.
174. Id. at 552–53.
175. 560 U.S. 563 (2010). The Court in Carachuri-Rosendo held that where an alien could 
have been convicted as a recidivist for a second offense, a felony, but was instead charged with 
simple possession, the alien has not been convicted of an aggravated felony for the purposes of 
the INA. Id. at 582.
176. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). Here, the Court applied the categorical approach to determine 
whether a convicted qualified as an “aggravated felony under the INA,” and noting that the 
underlying facts of the crime were not to be examined). Id. at 1684.
177. See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1691–92 (rejecting a circumstance-specific analysis of a 
conviction for the purpose of determining if the conviction is an aggravated felony under the 
INA); Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 581–82 (holding that courts cannot consider uncharged 
conduct when determining whether an alien is convicted of an aggravated felony under the INA).
178. Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016).
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the CIMT inquiry, the BIA simply applied an old favorite—step one of 
the categorical approach.179
V. PROPOSED APPROACH
In light of the inconsistencies of the CIMT inquiry, this Note proposes 
that the BIA follow Attorney General Holder’s instruction and articulate 
one clear approach for how to determine whether a conviction qualifies 
as a CIMT.180 Although it failed, the attempt in Silva-Trevino I to 
promulgate consistency across the circuits was a step in the right direction 
for this often-neglected area of law. This Note suggests that the BIA 
adopt the realistic-probability approach181 as step one of the traditional 
categorical inquiry, mandate a step-two modified categorical inquiry 
where the realistic-probability approach is ambiguous or the underlying 
statute of conviction is divisible, and reject the use of any extraneous 
evidence to prove moral turpitude outside of the conviction record. 
It is clear from the circuit’s rejection of Silva-Trevino I that what the 
courts took issue with was the addition of an unprecedented third step 
allowing immigration judges to consider additional evidence outside the 
conviction record. Concerns that proof of questionable veracity would be 
allowed in under such a step are not unfounded. Because the rules of 
evidence do not apply in immigration court, aliens and their lawyers 
would lack the safeguards necessary to protect against such a broad 
inquiry.182 Thus, moving forward, any standardized CIMT inquiry should 
similarly reject consideration of evidence outside the conviction record 
as inconsistent with Congress’s intent.
The BIA should adopt the realistic-probability test as step one of the 
traditional categorical approach. This test addresses over- and under-
inclusiveness concerns and best comports with recent Supreme Court 
precedent.183 Although not decided in the CIMT context, Duenas-Alvarez
                                                                                                                     
179. Moses, No. A206-352-760, 2015 WL 4537073, at *2 (B.I.A. June 10, 2015) (“To 
determine whether an offense constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, we apply a 
categorical approach.”).
180. Should the BIA fail to articulate a framework in this area of great national importance, 
the Supreme Court should intervene to provide the necessary clarity. See Jian Hui Shao v. BIA, 
465 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[O]nly a precedential decision by the [Board]—or the Supreme 
Court of the United States—can ensure the uniformity that seems to us especially desirable in 
[asylum] cases such as these.”).
181. See supra Subsection II.A.3.
182. See Hernandez–Guadarrama v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 674, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that 
the rules of evidence are not applicable in immigration court, and that constitutional and statutory 
due process provide some minimal due process protections).
183. See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alveras, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (establishing the realistic-
probability test as the appropriate standard for determining whether a crime is an aggravated 
felony under the INA).
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considered whether a conviction under a California theft statute 
constituted a “theft offense” under the INA.184 The underlying question 
resembles the one here, how to determine whether a particular state 
statute falls within a general category of offenses described under federal 
immigration law. The Attorney General’s rationale for adopting the 
realistic probability test in Silva-Trevino I was both simple and 
persuasive—“immigration penalties ought to be based on criminal laws 
as they are actually applied.”185 This approach avoids the glaring pitfalls 
of both the least-culpable-conduct test and the common-case approach,
and is best able to reconcile the goal of CIMT laws with the growing 
complexity of state penal codes. 
Where the plain language of the statute under the traditional 
categorical inquiry is ambiguous, the BIA should direct courts to proceed 
to the modified categorical inquiry. Where a statute is divisible and 
contains both conduct that is a CIMT and is not a CIMT, it will always 
be necessary to proceed to this step. In rejecting Silva-Trevino I, the 
circuits applied traditional tools of statutory interpretation, concluding 
that Congress’s clear intent was that courts focus only on the conviction
when determining whether a crime is a CIMT.186 As such, an alien’s 
record of conviction is a valid source of information when conducting a 
CIMT inquiry.187 Although conviction records will not literally reference 
moral turpitude, they will generally include the elements of the charged 
offense, at which point adjudicators may apply CIMT case law to 
determine whether those elements include moral turpitude. 
The modified categorical inquiry also comports with Supreme Court 
precedent. The proper methodology for categorizing convictions has 
previously been addressed by the Supreme Court in the context of 
criminal sentencing enhancement based on recidivism. In Taylor v. 
United States,188 the Supreme Court established a uniform standard for 
determining whether a prior conviction falls within a category that can 
serve as the predicate for enhanced sentencing.189 Fifteen years later, in 
Shepard v. United States,190 the Court held that facts contained in the 
record of conviction from a non-jury trial were also relevant to sentencing 
                                                                                                                     
184. Id. at 185.
185. Silva-Trevino I, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 698 (A.G. 2008), vacated by Silva-Trevino, 26 I. 
& N. Dec. 550 (A.G. 2015).
186. See supra Section III.C.
187. See Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Thus, in a case . . . in 
which the only issue is the alien’s prior conviction, the statute unambiguously directs that an 
adjudicator consider only the conviction itself, and not any underlying conduct.”).
188. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
189. Id. at 602.
190. 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
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enhancement where the plain language was ambiguous.191 In these cases, 
the Court approved of a process of categorization beginning with a 
categorical approach, looking only to the plain language of the statute to 
determine whether a specific offense substantially corresponds to the 
generic definition at issue.192 Where the plain language was ambiguous 
as to whether a specific conviction corresponded, the Court approved the
consideration of specific facts found in the record of conviction.193
In Duenas-Alvarez, the Supreme Court explicitly applied this 
categorization framework in the immigration context, employing 
Taylor’s categorical approach and stating that the modified categorical 
approach should be used where necessary.194 Based on these holdings, 
the BIA should specify that adjudicators are only to proceed to the 
modified categorical approach when the plain language of the statute is 
ambiguous as to whether the statute is always a CIMT. Under this rule, 
convictions under a divisible statute would always require consideration 
of the record of conviction, and the door would remain open for a
situation where a non-divisible statute is nonetheless ambiguous and 
requires consideration of the record of conviction. Adoption of the 
realistic-probability test for the traditional categorical approach, and use 
of the modified categorical approach only when the plain language of a 
statute so dictates, best comports with both Supreme Court precedent and 
Congress’s intent, and therefore should be adopted by the BIA in an effort 
to standardize the CIMT inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Undocumented aliens are a vulnerable population who often come to 
the United States without the resources or language skills necessary to 
navigate the complex American legal system.195 Aliens currently do not 
have a constitutional right to a government-funded lawyer in immigration 
proceedings,196 and can be easy targets for people looking to profit off of 
                                                                                                                     
191. Id. at 16.
192. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
193. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
194. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alveras, 549 U.S. 183, 187 (2007).
195. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SPEAKING ENGLISH, ENGLISH-SPEAKING ABILITY OF THE 
FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION BY WORLD REGION OF BIRTH: 2012 (2012), http://www.census.gov/
content/dam/Census/newsroom/releases/2014/cb14-105_englishspeakingability_graphic.pdf
(finding that fifty percent of the total foreign born population above five years old spoke English 
less than “very well”).
196. KATIE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43613, ALIENS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF (2016), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P11612.pdf.
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the immigration process.197 President Trump has made clear that he 
intends to prioritize the removal of all aliens with criminal records, with 
no indication of exceptions for minor convictions.198 Because the INA 
frequently conditions the grant of immigration relief on an applicant 
having no prior CIMT convictions, it is more important than ever that we 
address the continued inconsistencies found in CIMT jurisprudence. 
“[F]amously ambiguous,”199 even where the Constitution plainly calls for 
uniformity,200 adoption of a uniform CIMT inquiry would provide much-
needed guidance to courts, lawyers, and aliens. Where the stakes are at 
their highest, special attention should be paid to ensure consistent and 
equitable administration of the law, regardless of immigration status. 
                                                                                                                     
197. See USCIS Initiative to Combat the Unauthorized Practice of Immigration Law,
BEACON: OFFICIAL BLOG OF USCIS (June 9, 2011), http://blog.uscis.gov/2011/06/uscis-initiative-
to-combat-unauthorized.html.
198. See supra notes 32−33 and accompanying text.
199. Olivas–Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2013).
200. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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